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EMPLOyMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND ThE SPREAD Of 
hEALTh CARE–ASSOCIATED INfECTIONS
ADAM SETh LITWIN, ARIEL C. AVGAR, AND EDMUND R. BECKER*
On any given day, about one in 25 hospital patients in the United 
States has a health care–associated infection (hAI) that the patient 
contracts as a direct result of his or her treatment. fortunately, the 
spread of most hAIs can be halted through proper disinfection of 
surfaces and equipment. Consequently, cleaners—“environmental 
services” (EVS) in hospital parlance—must take on the important 
task of defending hospital patients (as well as staff and the broader 
community) from the spread of hAIs. Despite the importance of 
this task, hospitals frequently outsource this function, increasing the 
likelihood that these workers are under-rewarded, undertrained, 
and detached from the organization and the rest of the care team. 
As a result, the outsourcing of EVS workers could have the 
unintended consequence of increasing the incidence of hAIs. The 
authors demonstrate this relationship empirically, finding support 
for their theory by using a self-constructed data set that marries 
infection data to structural, organizational, and workforce features 
of California’s general acute care hospitals. The study thus advances 
the literature on nonstandard work arrangements—outsourcing in 
particular—while sounding a cautionary note to hospital 
administrators and health care policymakers.
On any given day, one in every 25 patients in U.S. hospitals has a health care–associated or hospital-acquired infection (hAI)—one of a 
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handful of so-called superbugs that contribute to the deaths of 75,000 of 
these patients (Magill et al. 2014) and exact direct medical costs of nearly 
$34 billion per year (Scott 2009). What is more, these hAIs—with names 
such as Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Vancomycin-resistant 
Enterococcus (VRE), and Clostridium difficile (C. diff.)—are the direct result of 
the patient’s hospital treatment (Peleg and hooper 2010) and in most cases 
are preventable.
Not surprisingly, health care practitioners and scholars have turned their 
attention to clinical and delivery-of-care factors that might account for hAIs 
(Glance, Stone, Mukamel, and Dick 2011; Calfee 2012; Magill et al. 2014). 
Thus, health care researchers have been paying careful attention to the gen-
eral clinical and hygiene-related practices employed by frontline providers 
(Ducel, fabry, and Nicolle 2002; Peleg and hooper 2010; Krein, Kowalski, 
hofer, and Saint 2012). Providers’ hand-washing routines, for example, 
have been studied as a likely contributor to the spread of hAIs (Calfee 
2012), garnering the attention and scrutiny of more than one MacArthur 
“genius” grantee (Gawande 2009; Pronovost and Vohr 2010). Other schol-
ars have examined the cleaning standards and requirements applied to hos-
pital spaces and medical devices (Ducel et al. 2002; Dancer 2009; Carling 
and Bartley 2010; Currie 2013), while still others have examined the finan-
cial incentives driving the allocation of hospital resources for dealing with 
hAIs (e.g., Calfee 2012; Lee et al. 2012). These areas of inquiry are clearly 
important to addressing the hAI crisis. As we will argue in this article, how-
ever, combating hAIs also requires a better understanding of the link 
between organizational and employment relations factors and quality-of-
care deficiencies. According to this argument, hAIs are likely associated 
with employment practices and patterns that are inconsistent with high-
quality care delivery. Specifically, the outsourcing of some logistical and sup-
port staff functions to nonhospital workers is likely to increase hAI rates.
We contend that alongside clinical and delivery-of-care factors, employ-
ment relations patterns and arrangements also help to explain hospital-level 
variance in the ability to keep patients safe from hAIs. More specifically, we 
maintain that the employment patterns and conditions of what some might 
refer to as “ancillary” or “peripheral” workers have a significant effect on the 
spread of hAIs. Unlike that for some infections, the etiology of these hAIs 
is—from a medical perspective—simple and tractable: the spread can be 
halted through strict infection-control practices, namely, proper disinfec-
tion of surfaces and equipment. As a result, cleaners, or, in hospital par-
lance, “environmental service” (EVS) workers, are likely to play a central 
role in combating the spread of hAIs. Consequently, the employment 
arrangements under which these workers perform their tasks and that gov-
ern the manner in which they are managed, trained, compensated, and 
treated are likely to contribute to their preparedness and ability to do so.
This article makes two explicit contributions, one specific to the health care 
setting and a second one that informs the general outsourcing and 
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contracting literature. first, we provide novel, quantitative, empirical evidence 
linking a specific type of employment arrangement—outsourcing—to patient 
safety. Thus, we show that in addition to the more widely examined clinical 
culprits, the hAI challenges plaguing the U.S. health care system are also a 
function of the strategic employment choices that organizations make in relat-
ing to their nonclinical staff. Indeed, employment relations scholars have long 
maintained that in the health care context, the manner in which work is orga-
nized and managed has dramatic implications for a host of organizational per-
formance metrics, including patient care (e.g., Given, Avgar, and Liu 2010; 
Avgar, Givan, and Liu 2011). Nevertheless, the focus of much of this research 
has been on the arrangements and practices characterizing employment rela-
tionships for highly skilled, clinical workers. Building on Zuberi’s (2013) quali-
tative research, we focus on a segment of the health care workforce that is 
often ignored when it comes to patient care-related outcomes.
Second, our study contributes to the more general and long-standing 
debate around the deployment of flexible work arrangements and their 
implications for different stakeholder outcomes. Scholars across disciplines 
have provided mixed evidence on the consequences associated with the use 
of flexible work arrangements in general and of contracted employees in 
particular. Some scholars have pointed to the flexibility benefits associated 
with the use of such work arrangements (Lepak and Snell 1999; Lepak, 
Takeuchi, and Snell 2003), while others have documented their potential 
negative effects on workers’ wages, working conditions, and overall well-
being (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin, and hudson 2000). flexible work arrange-
ments have therefore been promoted both as an effective tool through 
which to improve organizational efficiency and as an antecedent to poor 
employment conditions and decreased quality in the production of goods 
or the delivery of services.
In what follows, we review the existing research on flexible work arrange-
ments and contracted work. We next move from the general to the specific 
and focus on flexible work arrangements in the health care setting, outlin-
ing what we know empirically about the outsourcing of hospital cleaners. 
Building on this discussion, we then present the data and methods we will 
use to show that the use of outsourced cleaners in fact positively predicts 
infection rates, after which we offer statistical support for the hypothesis. We 
conclude with a discussion regarding the implications our findings have for 
understanding the link between organizational employment practices for 
noncore employees and the quality of patient care.
Nonstandard Employment Arrangements for Peripheral Workers
Like many managerial decisions surrounding human resources (hR) or 
labor relations, the decision to contract out is a strategic one (Kochan, 
McKersie, and Cappelli 1984). In deciding what organizational functions to 
perform internally and which ones to outsource, organizations make strate-
gic choices about the costs and benefits associated with each of 
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these alternatives (Kalleberg et al. 2000; Mayer and Nickerson 2005; Dey, 
houseman, and Polivka 2010). Organizations that decide to outsource spe-
cific functions, therefore, are doing so because they are convinced that the 
benefits associated with this decision outweigh the potential costs. Davis-Blake 
and Uzzi (1993) provided evidence demonstrating that this cost-benefit analysis 
varies as a function of a number of internal and external factors.
Over the past three decades, a growing proportion of American firms 
have increased their reliance on flexible work arrangements, and evidence 
suggests that this trend will persist (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Lepak and 
Snell 1999; houseman 2001; Lepak et al. 2003; Mayer and Nickerson 2005). 
These organizations have sought out employment models that provide the 
promise of reduced costs (Kalleberg et al. 2000; Lepak et al. 2003), increased 
flexibility, and greater efficiency (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Dey et al. 
2010). In this quest, many firms across an array of industries have turned to 
the deployment of nonstandard work arrangements that weaken the tradi-
tional attachment between employees and their employers and therefore 
reduce many of the transaction costs associated with the traditional employ-
ment pattern (Kalleberg 2008; Dey et al. 2010). A number of nontraditional 
or nonstandard work arrangements have proliferated under this general 
category, from temporary employment to the outsourcing of positions and 
functions (Kalleberg et al. 2000; Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George 2003).
Researchers have documented the pressures that have pushed firms to 
experiment with flexible work arrangements and to outsource positions and 
functions to external contractors (e.g., houseman 2001). Use of nonstan-
dard employment arrangements has been seen by scholars and practitioners 
as a vehicle through which organizations can, among other things, confront 
environmental uncertainties and volatility (Davis-Blake et al. 2003). Out-
sourcing of functions that could alternatively be integrated vertically, for 
instance, provides firms with increased flexibility to expand or shrink 
employment levels in response to financial or competitive pressures (Osterman 
1987).
Alongside evidence regarding the potential and anticipated benefits that 
motivate employers to adopt flexible work arrangements, considerable evi-
dence exists regarding the negative consequences associated with this 
employment pattern (e.g., Erickcek, houseman, and Kalleberg 2003; Kalle-
berg 2008). for example, empirical evidence has demonstrated the negative 
effects that flexible work arrangements have on employees in nonstandard 
employment relationships (Kalleberg et al. 2000; Kalleberg 2008). Among 
these are decreased wages and benefits (Dube and Kaplan 2010) and greater 
levels of job insecurity (Kalleberg et al. 2000; Kalleberg 2008). In addition to 
the consequences for employees, the flexibility benefits associated with non-
standard work practices often come at the expense of internal organizational 
control (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Lepak and Snell 1999): Nonstandard 
work arrangements challenge the firm’s ability to provide for a stable and 
predictable workforce and to ensure adequate coordination and control 
over task-interdependent production or service processes.
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In an effort to reconcile this mixed track record—flexibility benefits on 
the one hand and control and coordination costs on the other hand—some 
scholars have proposed a contingent approach to the use of nonstandard 
employment arrangements, one that accounts for the organization’s hR 
architecture. Lepak and Snell (1999), for example, identified four distinct 
employment models that correspond to different human capital needs and 
characteristics. According to this perspective, the adoption of flexible work 
arrangements is suitable for certain roles and positions within the organiza-
tion but not for others. Organizations, according to this argument, assess the 
extent to which the benefits associated with a nonstandard work arrange-
ment outweigh the costs under different organizational conditions and for 
different organizational and worker groups (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993). 
More specifically, managers must scrutinize the human capital required of 
each job to determine the extent to which the firm is “inherently dependent 
upon its potential to contribute to the competitive advantage or core compe-
tence of the firm” (Lepak and Snell 1999: 35) and the degree to which the 
skills in question are uniquely valuable to the particular employer—“firm-
specific,” as the human capital literature would label them (Becker [1964] 
1994). Our empirical evidence contributes to this area of inquiry by examin-
ing the relationship between the outsourcing of EVS workers and hAIs. In 
what follows, we develop the proposition that in the health care context, 
both core and noncore employees can play an important role in advancing 
patient care, and thus the outsourcing of noncore functions engenders many 
of the same costs associated with the outsourcing of core functions.
Outsourcing of Noncore Employees and Performance  
Outcomes in Health Care
The health care sector serves as a uniquely fitting setting in which to exam-
ine the relationship between outsourcing and organizational performance. 
Persistent regulatory and market-related pressures have engendered wide-
spread organizational restructuring (fennell and Alexander 1993; Scott, 
Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000), including an increased reliance on non-
traditional work arrangements, particularly outsourcing (Appelbaum, Berg, 
frost, and Preuss 2003; Davies 2010). Much of the empirical evidence 
regarding this phenomenon, however, focuses on the outsourcing of front-
line clinical staff. Our general argument builds on this stream of research, 
but, as noted above, it focuses on the outsourcing of nonclinical work in the 
form of EVS.
hospital efforts to address increasing financial and competitive pressures 
by restructuring internal staffing practices have rendered a dramatic shift in 
the organization of work. Employment relations scholars have provided 
extensive evidence for the relationship between work practices and arrange-
ments and outcomes for employees and patients in the health care setting 
(e.g., Gittell, Seidner, and Wimbush 2010; Avgar et al. 2011). According to 
this stream of research, work arrangements and the manner in which a 
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health care organization’s workforce is managed influence both the ease 
with which coordination across disciplinary boundaries occurs (Gittell et al. 
2010) and employee attitudes and perception toward these organizations, 
including commitment and attachment to the organization (Clark, Clark, 
Day, and Shea 2001; Avgar et al. 2011). Taken together, this evidence pro-
vides support for the long-standing employment relations argument that 
practices that promote and facilitate greater employee voice, discretion, and 
connection to the organization are likely to affect outcomes for both employ-
ees and employers, consistent with findings reported above linking flexible 
work arrangements to negative employee and performance outcomes.
health care scholars have also documented the significant relationship 
between staffing practices and patient care outcomes (e.g., Aiken et al. 
2002). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence linking flexible staffing prac-
tices to negative patient care outcomes has been predicated on the study of 
highly skilled health care professionals, particularly registered nurses. What 
about the relationship between flexible work practices pertaining to non-
core employees and their impact on hospital performance? Scholars distin-
guishing between core and peripheral employees would argue that the 
negative relationship between flexible work arrangements for nurses and 
patient care outcomes is not necessarily generalizable to noncore employ-
ees such as EVS workers.
We maintain that the trade-off between flexibility and control that inheres 
in the use of flexible work arrangements can create coordination and work-
force attachment challenges for low-skilled, noncore workers as well as for 
highly skilled core employees. The health care setting, characterized by a 
high degree of complexity and task-interdependence, requires sophisti-
cated coordination across diverse employee groups (Gittell et al. 2010). As 
noted above, EVS workers play a central role in performing tasks that, while 
nonclinical in nature, are essential to halting the spread of hAIs. further-
more, these nonclinical tasks influence and are influenced by tasks per-
formed by clinical staff (Dancer 2011; Calfee 2012). Thus, in the wake of 
this fundamental task interdependence and the need for cross-functional 
coordination, we build on the employment relations evidence reviewed 
above to hypothesize that greater levels of EVS workforce outsourcing will 
be associated with a higher incidence of hAIs.
Indeed, rich ethnographic evidence offered by Zuberi (2013) paints a 
detailed portrait of the pressures that have driven hospitals to outsource 
their EVS function and the consequences this has had for employees and 
their ability and preparedness to do the work that is necessary to keep hos-
pitals clean and safe (Litwin 2014). Zuberi documented the many chal-
lenges outsourced EVS workers face in their efforts to meet the cleaning 
standards required for the prevention of hAIs. he also argued that out-
sourced EVS workers are overworked and understaffed, a combination that 
makes their work stressful and extremely difficult. his interviews with out-
sourced employees also supported the claim that outsourcing EVS work 
leads to a reduction in employee training and education. finally, Zuberi’s 
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study pointed to the lack of hospital control and weak supervision associ-
ated with EVS outsourcing and highlighted the inextricable relationship 
between shedding the responsibility for the management of an EVS work-
force and the ability to adequately control and monitor required cleaning 
standards.
Zuberi’s findings therefore provide an important foundation for our 
study by supporting the link between outsourced EVS workers and employ-
ment conditions that are likely to constrain hospital efforts to combat hAIs. 
What his rich descriptive work could not do—because of the qualitative 
methods he employed to examine the outsourcing phenomenon—was 
demonstrate statistically that outsourcing drives the spread of hAIs at the 
hospital level. Thus we couch our argument in three related rationales that 
stem from received ethnographic research and from the literature touched 
on above. first, outsourcing is likely to significantly reduce EVS worker 
attachment and commitment to the hospital, which may affect the diligence 
with which important hAI prevention tasks are performed. hAIs can spread 
when even minor flaws in the cleaning of hospital surfaces occur. Consider, 
for example, the potential impact of infectious spores being left uncleaned 
(or improperly cleaned) on the portable pole on which an IV bag is hung or 
even on the floor in a single patient room. The danger extends far beyond 
the handful of patients who stay in that room, spreading from room to room 
to potentially affect the entire facility (Koppel, Gordon, and Telles 2012). 
furthermore, outsourcing of EVS workers is, by construction, associated 
with reduced hospital control over this workforce. As noted above, by exter-
nalizing this function, hospitals gain flexibility but give up managerial con-
trol. To the extent that EVS employees perform tasks that, combined with 
clinical care, are central to the prevention of hAIs, relinquishing this con-
trol is likely to limit the hospital’s ability to ensure adequate compliance 
with evidence-based standards and requirements. Second and closely related 
to this point, outsourcing of EVS workers will hinder coordination, which 
may limit the effectiveness of interdependent efforts between contracted 
cleaners and employee staff to prevent hAIs. And finally, the reduction in 
managerial control over this segment of the workforce is likely to have impli-
cations for investments made in EVS workers’ skills and training (Lynch and 
Black 1998), which are central to their ability to combat the conditions that 
lead to hAIs.
Data and Methods
Data
This analysis focuses on one superbug in particular—Clostridium difficile  
(C. diff.). More so than any other hAI, C. diff. is the most closely tied to the 
overall cleanliness of hospitals and thus to the work undertaken by hospital 
cleaners. According to Zuberi (2013), C. diff. lingers for extended periods 
of time on sheets, floors, toilets, and other surfaces but only in the absence 
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of proper cleaning. Whereas other superbugs die when they dry out, C. diff. 
instead forms spores that readily spread even under arid conditions by work-
ers’ hands and contaminated equipment. Even alcohol-based hand sanitiz-
ers, so effective on other virulent germs, cannot contain C. diff. yet it can be 
contained quite easily with the proper chemicals, as long as they are pro-
vided to EVS staff, and workers are trained in their use. Specifically, infec-
tious disease experts recommend the use of an accelerated hydrogen 
peroxide solution or a 1:10 bleach solution, both of which eradicate C. diff. 
spores (Boyce 2007; Boyce et al. 2008; Zuberi 2013). When this does not 
occur, and patients are stricken with C. diff., the symptoms include dehydra-
tion, debilitating diarrhea, perforated bowel, gastrointestinal bleeding, and 
fatal inflammation of the colon (Zuberi 2013). According to recent esti-
mates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, C. diff. was 
responsible for almost half a million infections in the United States alone in 
2011, 29,000 of which directly resulted in death (Lessa et al. 2015).
In analyzing the spread of C. diff., we draw on a cross section of general 
acute care hospitals operating in the state of California in 2012. We chose 
California because of its large number of hospitals. It leads the country in 
the number of staffed hospital beds, total discharges, patient days, and gross 
patient revenue. from a more pragmatic perspective, it also compels its hos-
pitals to report reliable data on the incidence of hAIs, especially C. diff., to 
its state Department of Public health (CDPh) on an annual basis. The 
state’s hospitals are also required to submit an annual financial disclosure 
report to the Office of Statewide health Planning and Development 
(OShPD), from which we can construct dollarized proxies for a hospital’s 
employment arrangements. finally, we can marry these and other data pro-
vided by the CDPh to data on a hospital’s structural characteristics culled 
from the American hospital Association (AhA) annual survey database.
Table 1 defines, constructs, and sources each of the variables called upon 
in the quantitative analysis. Our focal dependent variable is the number of 
laboratory-identified “hospital-onset” cases of C. diff., measured as the num-
ber of positive stool samples obtained on day four or later during the hospital 
stay, recorded over the 12-month reporting period. Note that aside from 
being a hard outcome as opposed to a “process measure” such as compliance, 
this is a more conservative and more reliable operationalization than 
“community-onset” cases, which would include inter alia positive samples col-
lected during the first three days of a hospital stay. Also note that in addition 
to this count measure, parts of our analysis employ a binary transformation of 
the count variable, equal to one for those facilities revealing a non-zero count.
Our focal explanatory variable is actually a ratio rooted in the data col-
lected by the California OShPD. following Dalton and Warren (2014), we 
divide the dollars spent on purchased services for the housekeeping or envi-
ronmental services cost center by the total direct expenses incurred for EVS. 
Thus the numerator explicitly excludes employee salaries, wages, and ben-
efits as well as supplies purchased directly by the hospital, expenses that are 
among those that are captured in the denominator. We assessed the validity 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions, Construction, and Sources
Variable Definition/Survey item(s) Construction Source
C. diff. cases Number of hospital-
onset cases of C. diff., 
i.e., positive stool 
samples obtained on 
day four or later 
during the hospital 
stay, recorded over 
the reporting period
Count variable measured in 
cases reported
California Department 
of Public health 
healthcare-
Associated Infections 
(hAIs) report on 
Clostridium difficile 
(C. diff.) infections 
in California general 
acute care hospitals
C. diff.-positive Whether the hospital 
recorded at least one 
hospital-onset case of 
C. diff. over the 
reporting period
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
variable C. diff. cases > 0, 
and 0 if C. diff. cases = 0
California Department of 
Public health 
healthcare-Associated 
Infections (hAIs)
report on Clostridium 
difficile (C. diff.) 
infections (CDI) in 
California general 
acute care hospitals
housekeeping 
purchased 
services share
Purchased services as a 
share of the total 
direct expenses 
incurred for 
housekeeping at the 
hospital
Continuous measure of 
dollars spent on 
purchased services for 
housekeeping divided by 
the total amount of 
expenses incurred by the 
housekeeping cost center
Audited annual 
financial disclosure 
report submitted to 
California Office of 
Statewide health 
Planning and 
Development
Total 
housekeeping 
expenses
Total direct expenses 
incurred for 
housekeeping at the 
hospital
Continuous measure of 
dollars spent by the 
housekeeping cost center
Audited annual financial 
disclosure report 
submitted to California 
Office of Statewide 
health Planning and 
Development
Total beds Total number of beds 
set up and staffed at 
the hospital at the 
end of the reporting 
period
Continuous variable 
measured in number of 
beds
American hospital 
Association (AhA) 
annual survey 
database
Case mix index Resources needed to 
treat the hospital’s 
mix of patients 
during the calendar 
year
Continuous variable 
measured as weighted 
sum of the hospital’s 
Medicare Severity-
Diagnosis Related Groups 
(MS-DRG) divided by the 
total number of 
discharges over the 
reporting period
California Department 
of Public health, 
healthcare 
Information Division 
and California Office 
of Statewide health 
Planning and 
Development
for-profit Whether the hospital is 
operated by a for-
profit entity
Binary variable in which 1 
implies that the hospital is 
controlled by an investor-
owned for-profit 
individual, partnership, or 
corporation, and 0 implies 
the hospital is controlled 
by the government, the 
church, or another not-
for-profit entity
American hospital 
Association (AhA) 
annual survey 
database
(continued)
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Variable Definition/Survey item(s) Construction Source
Urban Whether the hospital is 
located in and serves 
an urban area
Binary variable in which 1 
implies a Core-Based 
Statistical Area (CBSA) of 
“metropolitan” or larger, 
and 0 implies a CBSA 
defined as “rural” or 
“micropolitan”
American hospital 
Association (AhA) 
annual survey 
database
Academic Whether the hospital is 
classified as 
academic
Binary variable in which 1 = 
“yes” and 0 = “no”
American hospital 
Association (AhA) 
annual survey database
Readmissions after 
heart attack
Share of heart attack 
patients readmitted 
within 30 days of 
discharge
Continuous, risk-adjusted 
measure of the share of 
30-day unplanned patient 
readmissions for heart 
attack (acute myocardial 
infarction) patients—
lagged by one year
Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services’ 
(CMS) hospital 
Compare database
Patient satisfaction 
with hospital
Share of patients rating 
their overall 
satisfaction with the 
hospital as “high”
Continuous measure of the 
share of respondents over 
the course of the year 
that responded to “Using 
any number from 0 to 10, 
where 0 is the worst 
hospital possible and 10 is 
the best hospital possible, 
what number would you 
use to rate this hospital 
during your stay?” by 
choosing the numbers 9 
or 10—lagged by one 
year.
hospital Consumer 
Assessment of 
healthcare Providers 
and Systems 
(hCAhPS) annual 
survey of patients’ 
perspectives of 
hospital care
Security 
purchased 
services share
Purchased services as a 
share of the total 
direct expenses 
incurred for security 
at the hospital
Continuous measure of 
dollars spent on 
purchased services for 
security divided by the 
total amount of expenses 
incurred by the security 
cost center
Audited annual 
financial disclosure 
report submitted to 
California Office of 
Statewide health 
Planning and 
Development
Total security 
expenses
Total direct expenses 
incurred for security 
at the hospital
Continuous measure of 
dollars spent by the 
security cost center
Audited annual 
financial disclosure 
report submitted to 
California Office of 
Statewide health 
Planning and 
Development
Table 1. Continued
of this accounting or dollarized outsourcing measure by reaching out to a 
random selection of hospitals included in our sample. We asked hospital 
administrators about their outsourcing and staffing arrangements for the 
EVS function in their facilities, and the answers bolstered our confidence in 
our outsourcing measure. Those hospitals that used only outside workers to 
staff the EVS function, including the management of the EVS function, had 
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purchased services ratios between .85 and .97. Where all EVS workers were 
instead actual employees of the hospital, the purchased services ratio ranged 
from .01 to .22. hospitals employed various mixtures of internal and out-
sourced workers, sometimes relying on outsourced workers to fill in for 
vacationing employees. Some hospitals actually use their own employees on 
the front lines but use outsourced workers to supervise these internal 
employees. As one would expect, these cases mapped into purchased ser-
vice ratios between those we found for the two “extreme” groups.
We call upon the next cluster of independent variables listed in Table 1 
only as controls. first, since our focal independent variable is a ratio in 
which total direct expenses for EVS appears in the denominator, we believe 
it is important to include a direct measure of total direct EVS expenses in 
our estimates. Since the focal independent variable will—by construction—
be correlated with total expenses, and total expenses should be correlated 
with infection counts, the omission of a measure of total expenses would 
bias the estimate for the key variable of interest (Litwin, Avgar, and Prono-
vost 2012). The remaining controls capture “structural” features of hospi-
tals. Certainly the size of the hospital—measured as the number of 
beds—should affect the number of C. diff. cases reported each year. Like-
wise, one could expect that a hospital’s case mix could affect its ability to 
control infection rates, leading us to control for it as well. The case mix 
index represents the average diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight 
for each hospital. The OShPD calculates the index by summing the DRG 
weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of dis-
charges.
We also draw on three binary measures of whether a hospital is 1) oper-
ated on a for-profit basis, 2) located in and serving an urban community, 
and 3) academically affiliated. One could imagine that for-profit hospitals 
are more likely to outsource and more likely to be concerned about infec-
tion rates, meaning the exclusion of this control variable could bias the 
focal estimates. Likewise, infections are expected to spread faster where 
population densities are greater, disadvantaging urban hospitals in their 
ability to contain infections. finally, we also control for whether a hospital is 
an academic hospital. We do this for two reasons. first, one might expect 
academic hospitals to get more complicated cases than nonacademic ones. 
Second, academic status could be construed as a proxy for the quality of 
care delivered in the hospital. Irrespective of which if either force domi-
nates, the inclusion of this control variable should eliminate another poten-
tial source of bias.
The remaining four variables in Table 1 are drawn on in multiple ways to 
test the robustness of our principal analyses. The first pair, readmissions 
after heart attack and patient satisfaction with the hospital, represent an 
objective and a subjective measure of care quality, respectively. These pro-
vide more fine-grained controls for care quality than does the academic 
variable alone. They can also be used as dependent variables for robustness 
or falsification tests since the impact of EVS outsourcing should not 
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be realized with respect to either of these quality measures as it is for the 
incidence of C. diff. cases. While these variables have the benefit of being 
sourced from entirely different data sets—the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital Compare database and the hospital 
Consumer Assessment of healthcare Providers and Systems (hCAhPS) 
annual survey—they do not exist independently for all hospitals in our 
larger sample. furthermore, whereas all the other variables called on in the 
study are contemporaneous—that is, they reflect 2012 values—these two 
quality measures are lagged by one year. While it takes an entire calendar 
year to accumulate the total number of C. diff. cases for the year, with respect 
to measures of care quality, it makes more sense to consider the degree of 
care quality in place at the beginning of the year. having said that, we note 
that hospital-level quality scores tend to change minimally if at all from year 
to year.
The final two variables pertain to hospital security and bear a striking 
similarity to the two previously employed measures related to EVS outsourc-
ing. The first is a ratio of purchased services for the security cost center over 
the total expenses incurred by that cost center. The second is simply the 
denominator of the ratio—that is, the total direct expenses incurred over 
the course of the year for security. These two variables will also be called on 
for a robustness check, namely, to show that security outsourcing does not 
drive hAIs the way that EVS outsourcing does.
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the study sample appear 
in Table 2. Setting the dependent variable aside for the moment, note that 
the average hospital is nonprofit and nonacademic, serves an urban popula-
tion, and has just under 200 staffed beds. On average, a hospital devotes 
about a quarter of its annual housekeeping expenses to purchased services. 
Total direct expenses associated with housekeeping average $3.8 million for 
the year, though there is great variation about the mean. A deeper analysis 
of the EVS outsourcing ratio, total EVS expenses, total beds, and the case 
mix index reveals that they are distributed log-normally and thus will be 
transformed prior to their use in estimation.
Interestingly, neither the focal dependent variable nor its binary transfor-
mation appears to be strongly pairwise-correlated with the key explanatory 
variable. Not surprisingly, all the control variables except for-profit status 
are positively correlated with the number of reported C. diff. cases. further-
more, it appears that urban hospitals and academic hospitals treat a more 
complex mix of cases. for-profit and urban hospitals are more likely to out-
source housekeeping than are other hospitals. And larger hospitals have 
larger budgets, of course.
With respect to the final four variables in the table—those to be called on 
for robustness checks—the pairwise correlations line up as one would 
expect. for example, the size of the security budget is strongly correlated 
with the size of the housekeeping budget and with the size of the hospital, 
measured as the number of beds. It is also worth noting that the mean out-
sourcing ratio for security is .44, more than 83% greater than the 
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outsourcing measure for EVS. The two security variables, like the analogous 
measures for housekeeping, are distributed log-normally, so they, too, will 
be transformed prior to their use in estimation.
We can see from Table 2 that the average hospital reports about 28 cases of 
C. diff. each year and that the standard deviation is about 33 cases. Add to this 
that the count of C. diff. cases must be a non-negative integer, and the result is 
the distribution of observed C. diff. counts that appears in figure 1—a mono-
tonically decreasing frequency of C. diff. cases with two extreme observations.1
Methods
Given the nature and the distribution of the dependent variable, our first 
cut at the data should be a simple difference-in-means test in which the 
sample is split between those hospitals reporting zero C. diff. cases and those 
reporting one or more. We would expect to find that the mean proportion 
of purchased services is greater in the subsample of hospitals reporting a 
positive number of C. diff. cases. Advancing in our sophistication, we next 
estimate models that allow us to control for potentially confounding vari-
ables. Maintaining the split-sample approach, we will estimate logistic 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the dummy capturing 
whether or not the hospital reported one or more C. diff. cases in 2012. A 
positive coefficient estimate for the log purchased services ratio term even 
Figure 1. frequency Distribution of Reported Cases of Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) in 
California’s General Acute Care hospitals
Notes: The study sample encompasses 8,667 reported C. diff. cases across 297 hospitals.
1. The two glaring outliers in the histogram are Stanford University hospital and Cedars-Sinai Medical 
Center. Interestingly, both are world-renowned academic medical centers. The removal of these two 
observations does not affect the strength or precision of any of the estimates in this study.
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in the presence of the vector of control variables would thus support our 
thesis.
The weakness of both the difference-in-means and the logit estimates is 
that they treat those hospitals reporting a single C. diff. case exactly the same 
as those reporting 50 or more cases, about 20% of the sample. Consequently, 
we next estimate models that exploit this granularity. Statisticians discour-
age the use of OLS for estimating count variables like the one we employ, 
claiming that such estimates can result in inefficient, biased, and, worst of 
all, inconsistent estimates (Long 1997; Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Instead, 
they recommend using one of many models based on the Poisson distribu-
tion, the very distribution characterized by figure 1. In the present case, 
aside from addressing the challenges associated with count data, we must 
also acknowledge and address the fact that the dependent variable is “over-
dispersed”—the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean—point-
ing us toward a negative binomial regression model (NBRM) in place of the 
more parsimonious Poisson regression model. Thus, just as in the logit case, 
support for our theory would take the form of a positive coefficient on the 
ratio variable even in the presence of the aforementioned controls.
Results
Difference-in-Means
Recall from Table 2 that the mean ratio of purchased housekeeping services 
over total direct housekeeping expenditures is .24. figure 2 reveals the dif-
ference in means when the sample is split between those with zero C. diff. 
cases and those with one or more C. diff. cases. The top bar shows that 
among those hospitals reporting one or more C. diff. cases, the mean pur-
chased services ratio was .26. for those hospitals not reporting any cases at 
all, just 7.1% of the housekeeping budget went toward purchased services. 
Thus, C. diff.-positive hospitals appear to rely more on outsourcing arrange-
ments for cleaners or EVS than do C. diff.-negative hospitals, a difference 
that is highly statistically significant (p < .001, two-tailed). In sum, the difference-
in-means test is consistent with the theorized link between outsourcing and 
the spread of hAIs.
Logistic Regressions
The next key question is whether these results hold up in the presence of 
the aforementioned control variables. Model 1 in Table 3 provides a starting 
point by essentially reestablishing the results from the difference-in-means 
test, albeit in the logit framework rather than the linear one. Thus, in these 
models, a positive coefficient estimate implies that increases in a given vari-
able are positively associated with the probability that a hospital reports one 
or more C. diff. cases. The second model adds only the control for total 
housekeeping expenditures, which enters the equation positively. While its 
inclusion reduces the magnitude of the estimate attached to the 
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outsourcing measure, the latter remains a statistically significant, positive 
predictor of the likelihood of infection. Model 3 excludes the focal inde-
pendent variable, allowing us to examine the impact of the control variables 
in the absence of the outsourcing measure. Not surprisingly, log expenses 
and log size positively predict the presence of C. diff. in a hospital. however, 
the estimated impacts of case mix, for-profit status, urban location, and aca-
demic affiliation are insignificantly different from zero.
Model 4 is the first estimate in the article to reveal the theorized effects of 
outsourcing in the presence of potential confounders. In this model the 
outsourcing variable enters the equation with a positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient estimate, providing support for the notion that those 
hospitals relying more on outsourced cleaners are more apt to report one 
or more cases of C. diff. Thus, the outsourcing of hospital cleaners appears 
to be positively associated with the spread of this particular hAI, even after 
we normalize for total housekeeping expenditures, hospital size, and case 
severity and control for for-profit status, hospital location, and whether or 
not the hospital has an academic affiliation. furthermore, relative to the 
base model that includes only the control variables—model 3—the differ-
ence in BIC statistics provides strong support for model 4—the model in 
which we add the key predictor of interest (Raftery 1995).
figure 3 makes sense of these logit coefficients by illustrating the nonlinear 
impact of outsourcing on the spread of hAIs by using the estimates from 
model 4 to show fitted probabilities as a function of the outsourcing measure. 
More specifically, it plots the probability of a hospital’s reporting at least one 
Figure 2. Observed Mean Share of housekeeping Expenses Categorized as  
Purchased Services by Whether the hospital Reported at Least One Case  
of Clostridium difficile (C. diff.)
Notes: Bars represent observed means. Also reports the results of simple t-test of the difference-in-means, 
with the t-statistic and p-value.
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C. diff case as a function of the ratio of purchased services to total direct 
expenses for housekeeping, holding all the other variables at their sample 
means. Note that those hospitals that do no outsourcing of housekeeping 
whatsoever are about 73% likely to have one or more C. diff. cases. The prob-
ability increases with the ratio, steeply at first and then more slowly, reaching 
.91 by the time purchased services exhausts half of total direct housekeeping 
expenses. Thus the plot validates our prediction regarding the relationship 
between outsourcing and the spread of this particular infection.
Negative Binomial Regression Models
While the logit estimates predict the likelihood of there being any cases of 
C. diff., the count models can exploit the entire range of the dependent 
variable. These estimates are shown in Table 4, where each of models 1–4 is 
analogous to the same numbered logit model in Table 3. That is, once again, 
the first model can be thought of as a baseline model in the sense that it 
includes only the key predictor variable and not the control variables. Note 
that in model 1, the log ratio or outsourcing variable enters with a positive 
sign, suggesting that increases in the purchased services ratio correlate posi-
tively with increases in the dependent variable, at least in the absence of any 
controls. The impact of adding a measure of the absolute dollar amount 
spent on housekeeping, as we do in model 2, is exactly the same as it was in 
the second logit model. That is, the estimated impact of outsourcing is 
weakened but remains directionally as predicted and statistically significant.
Figure 3. Probability of One or More Cases of Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) Reported in 
California’s General Acute Care hospitals as a function of the Share of housekeeping 
Expenses Exhausted by Purchased Services
Notes: Plots show fitted probabilities derived from model 4 in Table 3, with all non-focal independent 
variables held at their sample means.
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As with the logit estimates, model 3 includes only the vector of control 
variables. Again, model 3 should become the base model against which to 
compare model 4. Model 4 allows us to examine the housekeeping ratio in 
the presence of control variables, and the results are quite supportive of our 
theory given the inclusion of the full vector of control variables: increases in 
the outsourcing measure are associated with an increased predicted case 
count. finally, as in the case of the logit estimates, relative to the base model 
that includes only the control variables—model 3—the difference in BIC 
statistics provides strong support for model 4 (Raftery 1995).
figure 4 shows predicted counts from model 4 in Table 4 as a function of 
the share of the housekeeping budget exhausted by purchased services. 
holding all non-focal variables at their sample means, those hospitals that 
do no outsourcing within the housekeeping function report about 17 C. diff. 
cases. The number increases with the amount of outsourcing, rapidly at first 
and then more slowly, increasing to about 36 cases once the outsourcing 
ratio reaches the halfway mark. In sum, our estimates provide strong 
evidence that outsourcing is, indeed, positively related to the incidence of 
C. diff.
Robustness Checks
A key concern one might have with our logit and NBRM estimates is the 
potential endogeneity of the outsourcing measure. Since the outsourcing 
decision cannot be randomly assigned in the cross section, it is possible that 
Figure 4. Predicted Cases of Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) in California’s General Acute  
Care hospitals as a function of the Share of housekeeping Expenses Exhausted  
by Purchased Services
Notes: Plot shows fitted probabilities derived from model 4 in Table 4, with all non-focal independent 
variables held at their sample means.
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some unobserved variable—call it managerial quality or just being a bad 
hospital—drives both the decision to outsource and higher infection rates. 
Were this the case, it would create a spurious relationship between outsourc-
ing and infections.
We take aim at this potential challenge to our findings by undertaking 
three sets of robustness checks. The first returns to the estimates we have 
already run but adds more fine-grained controls for care quality, seeking to 
determine whether or not the inclusion of these variables swamps the 
impact of EVS outsourcing on infection rates. The second shifts each of the 
two newly added quality measures from the right-hand side to the left-hand 
side, allowing us to determine whether or not the theorized link between 
outsourced cleaners and hAIs seems to describe the relationship between 
outsourcing and any proxy for care quality. The third set of robustness 
checks returns to the central logit and NBRM specifications but considers 
the impact of the outsourcing of a hospital’s security function as opposed to 
its housekeeping or EVS function on the incidence of C. diff.
Adding More Fine-Grained Controls for Objective and Subjective Care Quality
While our preferred specifications are model 4 in both Tables 3 and 4, note 
that each table includes three additional estimates that we have yet to discuss. 
Indeed, each of these estimates incorporates one or more additional quality 
variables on the right-hand side. In Table 3, model 5 adds a single regressor—
the share of heart attack patients with unscheduled readmissions within 30 
days of discharge. This is a standard, commonly used objective measure of the 
quality of care delivered by a hospital. Even in the presence of this newly 
introduced control variable, the relationship between EVS outsourcing and 
the probability of one or more C. diff. cases remains positive and statistically 
significant, albeit marginally so, in this case. This reduction in precision, 
though somewhat mitigated by an increase in the point estimate, is likely the 
result of the shrinking of the estimation sample. Model 6 replaces the objec-
tive measure of care quality with the subjective one—whether or not a patient 
rates his or her overall satisfaction with the hospital as “high.” Once again, its 
inclusion does not undermine the relationship between EVS outsourcing and 
the probability of a facility’s being C. diff.-positive. In fact, in this case, since 
the sample shrank by only 11 cases relative to model 4, the focal point esti-
mate maintained its precision. finally, with respect to the logits, model 7 in 
Table 3 includes both of the quality variables simultaneously. Once again, the 
estimate for the focal independent variable remains positive and even man-
aged to achieve statistical significance.
Models 5–7 in Table 4 undertake the analogous exercise with the NBRMs. 
The results are quite similar to those arising from the logit estimates. In 
short, while we cannot dispose of the possibility that some aspects of hospi-
tal quality are going unobserved in our analyses, a generally low regard for 
care quality does not appear to be the invisible driver of a spurious relation-
ship between EVS outsourcing and infection rates.
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Predicting Theoretically Unjustified Measures of Care Quality
Were the outsourcing of EVS work just a proxy for the quality of the hospital 
or of the work of the people managing it and were this proxy to somehow be 
positively associated with infection rates, it would likely be positively corre-
lated with other, less specific measures of care quality. We test this proposition 
with respect to both our objective and our subjective measures of care quality.
We first analyze the relationship between EVS outsourcing and the objec-
tive quality measure, 30-day heart attack readmission rates. Models 1–4 in 
Table 5 are analogous to models 1–4 in Tables 3 and 4. Since this dependent 
variable is continuous and uncensored, however, we can estimate it using 
OLS as opposed to logistic or negative binomial regression. Moreover, in 
order to view the point estimates at two significant digits, we have multiplied 
the dependent variable by 100—that is, to predict a percentage rather than 
a proportion. In short, in none of the models—including models 3 and 4, 
which include all the controls used in the principal analyses—does the EVS 
outsourcing variable even approach statistical significance. In model 2, the 
absolute amount of money spent on housekeeping is negatively associated 
with objective care quality, though this effect completely disappears in the 
presence of the other control variables.
Table 6 shows the results from repeating this exercise, the only difference 
being the dependent variable. These four estimates come from regressing 
the subjective quality measure, overall patient satisfaction with the hospital, 
Table 5. Impact of Employment Arrangements on hospital Readmissions after 
heart Attack: OLS Regression Estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(housekeeping purchased services share) .01 .03 .0002
 (0.35) (0.77) (0.01)
ln(total housekeeping expenses) −.13* .04 −.0003
 (−1.85) (0.31) (−0.002)
ln(total beds) −.06 −.01
 (−0.40) (−0.04)
ln(case mix index) −.29 −.56
 (−0.78) (−1.39)
for-profit .20 .14
 (0.98) (0.67)
Urban .45 .47
 (1.20) (1.22)
Academic −.53*** −.53***
 (−2.80) (−2.72)
R 2 .001 .01 .07 .07
n 246 246 216 204
Notes: Models are OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the share of patients readmitted 
within 30 days after heart attack over the course of the year (with t-statistics in parentheses). The 
dependent variable has been multiplied by 100 to make the point estimates readable at two significant 
digits.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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once again multiplied by 100, on four different sets of right-hand-side vari-
ables. Again, in absolutely no case can we discern a positive correlation 
between the outsourcing of a hospital’s cleaning services and a patient’s 
overall satisfaction with the hospital. In this case, however, it is interesting to 
note the extent to which the structural variables are associated with the 
dependent variable. for example, patients appear to prefer smaller hospi-
tals to larger ones and nonprofit hospitals to for-profit facilities. Nonethe-
less, we find no evidence that they rate their hospital more highly or more 
poorly when their cleaners are outsourced. Suffice it to say that the theo-
rized relationship between EVS outsourcing and infection rates does not 
hold for just any measure—objective or subjective—of care quality.
Considering the Impact of Outsourcing Security on Infection Rates
The final way we check for the spuriousness of our findings is by consider-
ing the outsourcing of a very different type of hospital work—security—for 
which we find no theoretical connection to infections.
Table 7 revisits the logit estimates from Table 3. Models 1–4 are analo-
gous to the models in Table 3: the only difference is that these models do 
not account for the outsourcing of EVS but instead include identically con-
structed variables for the security function. While we must point out that the 
urban indicator drops out of the model altogether (and is thus not displayed 
in the table), note that in model 1, the impact of the logged purchased 
Table 6. Impact of Employment Arrangements on Overall Patient Satisfaction with 
hospital: OLS Regression Estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(housekeeping purchased services share) −.34 −.35 .16
 (−1.57) (−1.54) (0.66)
ln(total housekeeping expenses) .07 1.43*** .57
 (0.16) (2.12) (0.72)
ln(total beds) −3.62*** −3.24***
 (−4.44) (−3.59)
ln(case mix index) 10.35*** 11.54***
 (5.30) (5.34)
for-profit −1.99* −2.65**
 (−1.75) (−2.21)
Urban −2.49 −2.66
 (−1.42) (−1.46)
Academic 1.87* 2.09*
 (1.87) (1.92)
R 2 .01 .01 .21 .21
n 284 284 271 240
Notes: Models are OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the share of patients rating their 
overall satisfaction with the hospital as “high” over the course of the year (with t-statistics in parentheses). 
The dependent variable has been multiplied by 100 to make the point estimates readable at two 
significant digits.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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services share of security has no impact at all on infection rates. This changes 
in model 2, which adds the denominator of the security purchased services 
share as a control. It is models 3–5, however, that are most compelling for 
the purposes of a robustness check. Model 3 includes only the controls, and 
the only variables that are definitively associated with infection rates are the 
overall size of the security budget and the size of the hospital. however, in 
contrast to model 4 in Table 3, the next model—the one that adds the secu-
rity purchased services share—reveals no association whatsoever between 
the outsourcing of security and the probability of a facility’s being C. diff.-
positive. Thus, model 4 in Table 7 helps drive home the point that it is the 
outsourcing of housekeeping, with its tight theoretical connection to infec-
tion rates, that matters with respect to infections. finally, model 5 supple-
ments model 4 by adding the two housekeeping variables—its outsourcing 
share and the total housekeeping budget. Security outsourcing remains 
insignificantly different from zero, and the EVS outsourcing variable enters 
with a positive sign. Once again, its statistical significance has become mar-
ginalized because of a loss of efficiency in the estimates: the sample has 
shrunk by more than 20% relative to what it was in model 4 of Table 3.
Table 8 offers an analogous robustness check of the NBRM estimates 
from Table 4 with very similar results. The outsourcing of hospital security 
does not influence the number of C. diff. cases at all, let alone with the 
Table 7. Impact of Employment Arrangements on the Spread of health Care–
Associated Infections (hAIs): Additional Logistic Regression Estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ln(security purchased services share) .13 .23** .09 .02
 (1.22) (2.11) (0.70) (0.16)
ln(total security expenses) 1.50*** .88** 1.08** .42
 (4.04) (2.16) (2.14) (0.61)
ln(total beds) 1.20*** 1.18** .79
 (2.62) (2.44) (1.35)
ln(case mix index) .39 −.19 .92
 (0.33) (−0.14) (0.60)
for-profit .94 1.60 1.74*
 (1.20) (1.62) (1.67)
Academic .03 −.31 −.30
 (0.04) (−0.34) (−0.30)
ln(housekeeping purchased services 
share) 
.30*
(1.75)
ln(total housekeeping expenses) .86
 (1.14)
AIC 116 95 101 85 81
BIC 123 105 125 108 111
n 249 249 238 196 195
Notes: Models are logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is whether the facility reported at 
least one case of C. diff. over the course of the year (with z-statistics in parentheses). Since the dummy 
variable capturing urban vs. rural gets dropped altogether from models 4 and 5, we omit it from the table 
entirely. AIC, Akaike Information Criterion; BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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instrumentality of EVS outsourcing. The security purchased services share is 
never a statistically significant driver of C. diff. counts. Moreover, when the 
EVS variables are added to the model in the presence of the security vari-
ables, the latter remain precise, positive predictors of the incidence of 
C. diff. Thus, were outsourcing just a proxy for poor management or low 
quality of care, to the extent such unobserved constructs were positively cor-
related with infection rates, then the outsourcing of security would also be 
positively associated with infection rates. It is not, further bolstering the 
credibility of the estimates that appear in Tables 3 and 4.
Discussion and Conclusion
The health care industry in the United States faces a significant crisis in its 
ability to deliver high-quality and safe patient care on a consistent and 
affordable basis. hospitals and other health care organizations continue to 
struggle with the need to meet two pressing yet often conflicting chal-
lenges—improving quality of care and surviving in a hypercompetitive envi-
ronment. In their efforts to meet competitive challenges, health care 
organizations often make strategic decisions that have the potential to 
undermine the quality of care they provide. In particular, decisions regard-
ing the employment models used to manage different segments of the 
Table 8. Impact of Employment Arrangements on the Spread of health Care–
Associated Infections (hAIs): Additional Negative Binomial Regression Estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ln(security purchased services share) −.04 .01 .002 −.03
 (−1.19) (0.27) (0.08) (−1.17)
ln(total security expenses) .73*** .29*** .37*** .12
 (13.42) (3.64) (4.00) (1.10)
ln(total beds) .74*** .64*** .37***
 (7.24) (5.52) (3.05)
ln(case mix index) 1.36*** 1.39*** 1.33***
 (5.11) (4.79) (4.85)
for-profit −.06 .01 .18
 (−0.44) (0.07) (1.20)
Urban .23 .61 .65*
 (0.73) (1.51) (1.65)
Academic −.08 −.11 −.19
 (−0.70) (−0.86) (−1.56)
ln(housekeeping purchased services 
share) 
.08***
(2.73)
ln(total housekeeping expenses) .55***
 (3.88)
AIC 2,267 2,128 1,955 1,683 1,657
BIC 2,278 2,142 1,983 1,712 1,694
n 249 249 238 203 202
Notes: Models are negative binomial regressions in which the dependent variable is the number of cases 
of C. diff. reported over the course of the year (with z-statistics in parentheses). AIC, Akaike Information 
Criterion; BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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workforce are often a function of an implicit or explicit trade-off between 
the cost of delivering care and the quality of the care delivered.
The hAI epidemic plaguing the health care system in the United States 
offers a troubling illustration of the difficulties many hospitals have ensur-
ing that their patients are safe and protected from unnecessary and prevent-
able harm during treatment and hospitalization. At the same time, this crisis 
also allows for an assessment of the effects that different employment models 
have on hospitals’ ability to confront these deadly and costly infections. In 
particular, this article examines the relationship between the outsourcing of 
EVS workers and the incidence of hAIs. Drawing on Zuberi’s (2013) quali-
tative work alongside a review of the literature, we hypothesized that the 
outsourcing of cleaners—nonclinical workers frequently viewed as non-
core—would have a significant, negative effect on a hospital’s ability to 
deliver on its core mission of providing high-quality and safe care. Specifi-
cally, we proposed that a hospital’s reliance on outsourced cleaners would 
be positively associated with its incidence of hospital-onset cases of one par-
ticular hAI, C. diff., that it reports in a given year. Our analysis of hAI rates 
in California’s general acute care hospitals provides strong support for our 
proposed link between the employment model used to manage EVS work-
ers and reported rates of C. diff., a particularly pernicious type of hAI that 
has become increasingly prevalent and virulent in North American hospi-
tals (Zuberi 2013).
Our findings have important implications for health care scholars, practi-
tioners, and policymakers. As noted above, much of the research examining 
the causes associated with the spread of hAIs has focused on clinical and 
technical factors. from a scholarly standpoint, our findings contribute to 
and extend a stream of research that has examined the link between employ-
ment relations and multi-stakeholder outcomes in health care (e.g., Gittell 
et al. 2010; Givan et al. 2010; Avgar et al., 2011; Litwin and Eaton 2016). The 
past decade has seen a proliferation of research that links work practices 
and employment relations factors to a host of employee and organizational 
outcomes. Nevertheless, much of this research has focused on the way in 
which these factors affect core clinical employees. This study builds on this 
established stream of research and supports the proposition that the way in 
which employees are managed significantly affects organizational perfor-
mance but does so by focusing on what many view as noncore, or periph-
eral, employees. Our findings therefore support the extension of this 
employment relations research stream to the wide array of nonclinical roles, 
from housekeeping to security guards, within the health care setting. Our 
findings also support the continued study of other employment practices 
and their effects on the host of quality and safety challenges that persist in 
hospitals and other health care organizations.
from a health care policy standpoint, our findings point to concrete and 
actionable measures that can be taken in the fight against hAIs. Very little, 
if any, attention has been given to the less glamorous role that employment 
relations and work arrangements play in facilitating conditions that can 
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affect the spread of hAIs (Koppel et al. 2012). Policy and reform measures 
have ignored the potential link between the increasing use of flexible work 
arrangements to manage noncore employees and the difficulties hospitals 
face in stemming the increased prevalence of deadly and costly hAIs. Our 
results provide a foundation for a public policy position that encourages 
hospital use of employment models that are consistent with a high-road 
strategy for noncore employees.
from a practical standpoint, our findings suggest that hospital adminis-
trators have a strong incentive of their own to reevaluate the manner in 
which they employ and manage their EVS workforce. The outsourcing of 
this workforce should be carefully reexamined and assessed on the basis of 
the proposed link to patient care outcomes. for example, one apparent 
downside to outsourcing EVS—that of poor communication and coordina-
tion—could well be mitigated by greater attention to issues associated with 
the commingling of standard and nonstandard workers (Davis-Blake et al. 
2003; Erickcek et al. 2003).
Our findings also advance the general study of employment relations and 
contribute to the established body of research on nonstandard work arrange-
ments and outsourcing in particular. Scholars across disciplines have pro-
vided mixed evidence on the consequences of nonstandard work for 
nonstandard workers (e.g., Kalleberg et al. 1997; Kalleberg 2000, 2011; Kal-
leberg et al. 2000; Barley and Kunda 2004). As reviewed above, this litera-
ture has also provided a wealth of empirical evidence linking employer 
outsourcing decisions to a wide array of negative outcomes. As noted, most 
of the outcomes examined have centered on employee-related conse-
quences, such as wages and working conditions. Our study, to the contrary, 
highlights the implications outsourcing has for a key measure of organiza-
tional performance in the health care setting—quality of care. In doing so, 
it advances the long-standing critique of outsourcing as an employment 
strategy by documenting the negative consequences for the organization, 
irrespective of any potential negative consequences for employees. Our 
findings therefore shift the debate away from the traditional and often sim-
plistic employer and employee division lines in which outsourcing benefits 
the former and harms the latter. When construed as a zero-sum game 
between these stakeholders, the direct, negative impact that externalization 
has on workers is often assessed against the expected performance improve-
ment for employers. Our findings suggest that these performance improve-
ments are by no means guaranteed and therefore call for a more nuanced 
debate around outsourcing practices.
Our findings also contribute to the debate regarding the outsourcing of 
noncore employees. As noted above, some scholars have argued that in mak-
ing outsourcing decisions, firms distinguish between core employees, who 
are difficult to replace and add unique value, and peripheral employees, for 
whom the cost of externalizing the employment relationship is lower 
(Thompson 1967; Lepak and Snell 1999, 2002). Our findings suggest that, at 
the very least, this strategic employment approach can come at a significant 
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cost to performance in some organizational settings. We demonstrate that in 
a setting that is known for a clear demarcation between workforce groups 
and categories, the outsourcing of what many scholars and practitioners view 
as one of the least central segments of the workforce has a profound and 
devastating effect on a crucial outcome and, put bluntly, endangers the lives 
of patients, not to mention other hospital staff and the community more 
broadly. This finding suggests that the relationship between noncore employ-
ees and the attainment of core organizational objectives may not be as simple 
and as inconsequential as some scholars have assumed.
Add to this a feature of work in the health care sector and many others that 
exacerbates these issues—task interdependence. In deciding whether workers 
belong in the core or the periphery, flexibility-related frameworks do not seem 
to fully account for the functional and social interdependence of work. for 
example, Kalleberg (2001) maintains that these frameworks do not account for 
the blending of core and peripheral workers in the production process. In the 
case of hospital cleaners, it appears that one source of the performance detri-
ment to using contracted cleaners is their social detachment from core mem-
bers of the care team (Stanwell-Smith 2012). It is not difficult to imagine similar 
challenges arising elsewhere in the service sector or even in manufacturing.
Our study is, of course, not without limitations. We examine the link 
between flexible staffing arrangements for noncore employees and opera-
tional performance in one industry. Thus our general critique of outsourc-
ing as an employment strategy can be challenged on the basis of its 
generalizability. To this we respond in four ways. first, we intentionally chose 
a role that would least arguably be considered peripheral in a setting with 
many more highly skilled and more highly paid employees undertaking the 
“real business” of the organization—health care delivery. Second, we also 
chose a job that exists in many if not most workplaces and is nearly always 
considered peripheral. Just as patients should be concerned that workers 
cleaning the hospital are ill equipped to do their jobs, customers at a restau-
rant or a dry cleaner should be similarly concerned that noncore members 
of their workforces do not know how to properly clean a counter, scrub a 
toilet seat, or launder a pair of dirty pantaloons. In short, the factors that 
influence the centrality of noncore employees in the health care industry 
present themselves in other industries as well. Third, notwithstanding the 
importance of generalizability, to the extent our intent was to challenge an 
existing theory, we need not demonstrate that it does not apply in every 
case. Rather, we must show that we have found a single exception. And 
finally, even if this were not the case, our findings have important and prac-
tical implications for organizations in the health care setting and are there-
fore important in their own right, irrespective of their generalizability.
A second concern in addition to generalizability is whether, to the extent 
that low pay, high turnover, poor treatment, lack of training, and lack of coor-
dination are driving increases in infections, the same dynamics might play out 
even if these EVS workers were direct employees of the hospital rather than 
employees of a contractor. Put another way, some might argue that our results 
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are a function of the poor implementation of outsourcing and not of out-
sourcing in and of itself. Thus one could further reason that the problem is 
not outsourcing per se but outsourcing done poorly. While this remains a pos-
sibility that must be explored in future research, given the dominant role that 
cost savings considerations tend to play in the decision to outsource (Appel-
baum et al. 2003; Zuberi 2013), the deployment of a high-road outsourcing 
approach is likely to be the exception and not the rule. Thus the dynamics 
that we theorize probably characterize most of the outsourcing of cleaners in 
our sample. Nonetheless, to the extent that our proposed mechanisms can 
play out with internal or external EVS workers and that some of our outsourc-
ing could well be outsourcing done well, then our estimates suffer from classi-
cal measurement error, making it all the more remarkable that we were able 
to identify a precisely measured, negative outsourcing effect.
In addition, the usual caveats regarding the use of cross-sectional data 
certainly apply to this study. Nevertheless, our own qualitative work and 
exploration of outsourcing data from other years makes clear that largely 
because of the stability of employment models and of structural features 
within the hospitals in our sample, longitudinal data would not be an effec-
tive means of controlling for time-constant unobservables. In the present 
case, the most concerning source of simultaneity would arise from some 
unobserved hospital characteristic that drives both the outsourcing decision 
and infection rates. While this remains a possibility, we subjected our esti-
mates to a set of robustness checks that we hope puts these concerns to rest.
finally, with respect to the article’s limitations, we must concede that 
while our study documents the statistical relationship characterizing the 
externalization of EVS work and infections, neither our methods nor our 
findings allow us to definitively pin down the mechanisms driving these 
results. In developing our hypothesis regarding the link between outsourc-
ing and hAIs, however, we argued that this relationship is the product of 
control, coordination, and attachment challenges associated with this 
employment model. Additional research will be needed to establish which 
of these mechanisms are truly driving the relationships we uncovered.
having acknowledged these important limitations and the research ques-
tions to which they give rise, we remain confident that our findings advance 
the study of employment relations in general and its application to the 
health care setting, in particular. As health care organizations continue to 
experiment with clinical and technological innovations designed to improve 
the quality of patient care, our findings serve as a reminder that alongside 
these innovations, employment decisions play a central role in determining 
hospital performance.
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